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Kate Grenville’s novel The Secret River (2005) is among the most recent 
fictional accounts of early contact history in Australia. The novel tells 
the story of William Thornhill, a convict whose life is based upon that of 
Grenville’s own ancestor, Solomon Wiseman. Like Wiseman, Thornhill is 
transported to New South Wales, and once freed, settles on the Hawkesbury 
River outside Sydney. Short-listed for several Australian and international 
literary prizes, and awarded the Commonwealth Writers’ Prize in 2006, the 
novel was followed by an exegetical volume, Searching for the Secret River 
(2006), “a writing memoir” detailing the process of researching and writing 
the novel.1 Together the novel and memoir are understood as significant 
contemporary cultural texts, reflecting and elaborating elements of the 
surrounding white Australian settler culture that forms the context of their 
production. This article proceeds from the position put forward by Aileen 
Moreton-Robinson that “[a]lthough the morphology of colonialism has 
changed, it persists in discursive and cultural practices” (Moreton-Robinson 
24). This discursive and cultural continuity will here lead to a characterisation 
of Grenville’s texts (and Inga Clendinnen’s, as discussed below) as settler-
colonial cultural texts, and therefore as significant for understanding the 
position and operation of the frontier in the contemporary settler-colonial 
culture of Australia. The central questions here are about how and in what 
form the frontier persists in contemporary Australian cultural texts such as 
Grenville’s. 
The problem that concerns Grenville in the novel and memoir is well 
summarised by her exchange with author Melissa Lucashenko. According to 
Grenville, Lucashenko asked where her family was from. Grenville reports 
her own response: 
So I sat gawping at Melissa, who was waiting for me to work out a 
response to the simplest question in the world. By way of answer, I 
told her a bit of the Wiseman story. ‘My great-great-great grandfather 
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was born in London . . .’ I began. I got to the bit about ‘he was freed 
and took up land on the Hawkesbury’.
‘What do you mean “took up”?’ she said. ‘He took’. (Grenville, 
Searching For The Secret River 28)
Through this distinction—offered as a plain statement by Lucashenko—
Grenville’s inherited ideas about her ancestor are teased apart, and the 
possibility of interest and inquiry emerges. As Grenville describes it:
Took up: you took up something that was lying around. You took up 
something that was on offer. You took up hobbies and sports.
Took had many more possibilities. You took something because it was 
there like a coin on the ground. You took offence or flight or a bath. 
Or you took something away from someone else. (28–9)
These quotations, as well as the rest of the passage in the memoir that 
follows Lucashenko’s question, of which they form a part, can be read as a 
distinction through which the contemporary liberal settler subject is defined 
and redefined in settler-colonial cultural texts. The apparent shift rehearsed 
here can be understood with reference to the concept of the frontier: it is the 
move from one side of the frontier, to the “other side” that is repeated in the 
passage. It signals the emergence of a form of recognition. 
This emergence of a space of recognition within settler cultural texts has, in 
the last several decades, been consistently framed by the discipline of history. 
One response to Grenville’s text has been that of historian Inga Clendinnen, 
whose criticisms are themselves indicative of the importance of these kinds 
of settler-colonial cultural texts as symptomatic examples of a wider settler-
colonial problem of the frontier. As I will discuss, both Grenville and 
Clendinnen represent settler positions that can be productively reread via the 
use of a rearticulated frontier concept.
As Grenville has explained in Searching for the Secret River, at several times 
during its early production she thought of it as history, and of her approach 
to research as historiographical, as opposed to imaginative. In following 
this trajectory, Grenville initially accepts the dominant cultural framework 
for interrogating the distinction taking/taking up. However, she concludes 
with the idea of doing a kind of empathetic history: “[. . .] I didn’t have to 
approach the past in a forensic frame of mind. I could experience the past—as 
if it were happening here and now” (47). During a radio interview, Grenville 
was asked for her position on the so-called ‘history wars’. She suggested that 
“a novelist can stand up on a step-ladder and look down at this, outside the 
fray, and say there is another way to understand it” (quoted in Clendinnen, 
“The History Question” 19).
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There is another, parallel, way in which Grenville describes the project as 
a kind of history. She depicts her work as a direct communication of the 
story within the place itself, Wiseman’s Ferry, on the outskirts of Sydney. As 
Grenville writes:
The place was speaking. It was language I didn’t know, but even so I 
was starting to understand [. . .]. Before it could be a book this was 
a story. That story was somehow part of all this—these trees, these 
rocks full of language that was lost. I didn’t own that story. It had to be 
allowed to speak for itself. My job was to get out of its way. (Grenville, 
Searching 171)
Grenville represents the novelist as trying to produce an empathetic history 
of settlement, but also trying to step back and allow the story of the place 
to appear.2 Grenville aligns this unmediated expression of place with her 
understanding of how Aboriginal people are figured in the text, perhaps with 
overtones of Romanticism, but certainly in a way that reflects the colonial 
alignment of Aborigines with Nature. As she writes:
I began to realise that the Aboriginal people were emerging in a way I 
hadn’t planned: through the description of landscape. The rocks, the 
trees, the river—I realised that I was often describing them in human 
terms—the golden flesh of the rocks beneath their dark skin, the trees 
gesturing, the bush watchful and alive. Humanising the landscape 
could be a way of showing the link between indigenous people and 
their land because, in some way that I recognised without really 
understanding, the country was the people. (199)
The idea of “recognising without understanding” functions here as an 
inflection of the emergence of a space of recognition, as suggested above. 
This suggests some possible problems with Grenville’s project, because it is 
not just that Grenville does not understand or represent Aboriginal relations 
to land. Rather, she ontologically aligns them, in a way that suggests that 
she is simply “recognising” them, a passive conduit for that alignment to 
appear—but that also has the effect of producing a kind of “knowing” 
settler belonging. This is the response that Grenville makes to the distinction 
taking/taking up. The question of how this relates to the content of the novel 
is still an open one, and will be addressed in the final part of the essay.
Grenville demonstrates a conception of the cultural politics of speaking for 
those Aboriginal people who appear in the novel. Once again there is a sense 
that this approach is about recognition, without knowledge. As she discusses 
in the memoir:
Back in Sydney, I made some decisions. I would get rid of all the 
Aboriginal dialogue. It might be historically accurate to have the 
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Aboriginal characters speaking broken English, but it made them less 
sympathetic, more caricatured.
Their inside story—their responses, their thoughts, their feelings—all 
that was for someone else to tell, someone who had the right to enter 
that world and the knowledge to do it properly.
I might not be able to enter Darug consciousness, but I could make 
it clear that there was one. To create a hollow in the book, a space of 
difference that would be more eloquent that any words I might invent 
to explain it. To let the reader know that a story was there to be told, 
but not to try to tell it. (198–199)
This suggests an implicit and un-theorised understanding that something 
is preventing Grenville from speaking unproblematically from Aboriginal 
perspectives. On the other hand, given her earlier reference to an unmediated 
“story of the place”, what does it mean for Aboriginal people to emerge 
“through the description of the landscape”? I would argue that this problem 
can be answered by accentuating the continuity of the frontier, by offering 
some kind of recognition of its durability in shaping these issues, rather than 
recognising Aboriginal stories by rhetorically ceding space. Such a point can 
be illustrated in relation to Clendinnen’s response to Grenville’s novel.
A significant part of Clendinnen’s 2006 Quarterly Essay is devoted to a 
historiographic critique of The Secret River. Clendinnen’s basic argument 
is that, contrary to Grenville’s statements at various times, The Secret 
River is not history, and the reasons for this are largely methodological or 
epistemological. The tone of the critique suggests that it is an assertion 
of disciplinary boundaries, and of the clear and demonstrable distinction 
between history and fiction. It is an example of the ways in which historians 
have rhetorically dominated discussion of the frontier in Australia since at 
least the 1970s.
This aspect of Clendinnen’s critique of Grenville emerges from her 
longstanding commitment to a project of renewing Australian historical 
thought. This project was first outlined in her Boyer Lectures, given in 1999, 
and can be seen as informing her Dancing With Strangers (2003), a history of 
the early years of European settlement at Port Jackson that has some parallels 
with Grenville’s novel.3 As Clendinnen suggested in her final Boyer lecture:
We need history: not Black Armband history and not triumphalist 
white-out history either, but good history, true stories of the making 
of this present land, none of them simple, some of them painful, all 
of them part of our own individual histories. (Clendinnen, “True 
Stories”, 102–3)
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Clendinnen suggests that history can be plural—elsewhere she suggests a 
“cornucopia of true stories” (101)—and complex, and that in this way it can 
address the ethical and political needs of the present, especially the needs of 
a national “we”. But Clendinnen does not address the continuing ethical and 
political effects of the past on the present, or the effects of the present on the 
historian.
The critique also emerges from her broader examination of the distinction 
between history and fiction, which in the Quarterly Essay is posed through 
the image of the “ravine”. Clendinnen’s understanding of this distinction is 
put most eloquently in certain passages from her own memoir, Tiger’s Eye 
(1999) where gives a sense of the disciplinary constraints of “good” history:
With history I am bound like Gulliver by a thousand gossamers: 
epistemologically to the deceitful, accidental record, morally to 
the dead men and women I have chosen to re-present, and to the 
living men and women I want to read my words and to trust them. 
(Clendinnen, Tiger’s Eye 244)
In contrast, she writes of fiction:
Fiction invents a world free from moral demands and from moral 
consequences, while imposing paradoxical restrictions of its own. We 
may invent experiences and put our own chosen shapes upon them, 
but the experiences must always be believable, which is something 
history does not require [. . .]. Fiction pretends that humans are 
simpler, more stable, more predictable than they are [. . .]. Fiction also 
affords the pleasure of the effortless penetration of fellow humans who 
are in the real world chronically enigmatic [. . .]. With fiction I turn 
into vapour, float through bone, look out through other eyes. (245)
If Grenville’s novel answers this account of fiction it is in its constitution as a 
project in response to the distinction taking/taking up, and its self-imposed 
limits, suggesting that the author of fiction is indeed bound by “moral” 
(and ethical, and political) demands present in the context from which their 
work emerges. Clendinnen argues that Grenville’s decision not to write 
Aboriginal dialogue and perspectives “reveals a contemporary delicacy of 
mind” (Clendinnen, “History Question” 19) and contrasts this position with 
Grenville’s explicit willingness to enter the consciousness of early nineteenth-
century Britons. Clendinnen then argues that, by so confidently “empathising 
with assorted Britishers from 200 years ago” (19), Grenville has overstepped 
the historically correct boundaries of interpretation. For Clendinnen, then, 
the past is “another country”, in the sense that she flattens the differences 
between British and Aboriginal agents so that both are epistemologically 
remote in approximately the same way for the contemporary historian. It is 
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precisely the frontier relation under consideration here that implies that such 
a flattening, a neutralisation, is inadequate, and it is by attending to this limit 
that Grenville does attempt to address the ethical and political in ways that 
Clendinnen does not. 
Following anthropologist Patrick Wolfe, who examines the changing 
morphology of settler-colonialism in Australia, it can be argued that this 
problem is evident to Grenville precisely because of the proximity between 
those settlers’ practices and our own. Wolfe outlines a history of race relations 
in Australia as the progressive enactments of settler articulation to land, and 
of changes that are strategic, but not fundamental, in how settlers approach 
Aboriginal possession. This suggests that the frontier is a continuous process, 
underwriting settler cultural texts, and that posing this conception of the 
frontier helps to make Grenville’s ethical and political problematic explicit.
Grenville’s response to this problematic is a broadly Romantic one: even 
when it is framed by the idea of “standing above” the history wars, it is about 
producing an empathetic “story of a place” that offers recognition without 
rational knowledge. This is itself an assertion of textual neutrality, an authorial 
strategy that attempts to give representational space without determining that 
space in advance, and contrasts with Clendinnen’s epistemological equivalences. 
In both cases, what is neglected—to greater or lesser extent—is the idea of the 
frontier as a continuous process that underwrites settler-colonial cultural texts 
and imposes real limits on the strategies those texts can mobilise. The frontier, 
for both of these writers, is a fait accompli, but they are actually enacting 
that accomplishment within their texts in different ways. For Grenville, the 
route towards such a settlement is more complex than for Clendinnen, whose 
disciplinary concerns obscure the importance of the frontier by making broad 
epistemological distinctions between fiction and history. In part, at least, the 
frontier is a kind of contemporary limit in how Grenville conceives her work. 
But the text of the novel itself suggests a different tendency, and ultimately a 
closer relationship between their two positions.
Grenville depicts Aboriginal claims to possession on equivalent terms to 
settler claims. This can also be read as a kind of neutrality towards both 
“sides” of the frontier. Grenville uses “yam daisies”—an indigenous food crop 
of the Hawkesbury River banks—as a metonym for Aboriginal possession 
in the novel. Upon the arrival of the settlers, the yam daisies are removed 
as weeds, and replaced by Thornhill’s family with corn. In turn, this corn 
is harvested by local Aboriginal people (Grenville, The Secret River 279), 
leading to a violent confrontation as Thornhill and his family try to prevent 
the harvest, and following this, beholden to a kind of logic of escalation, 
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the burning of the remains of the crop. This is a turning point in the novel, 
where Thornhill becomes unsettled in his own possession:  
He had thought himself secure at last on his hundred acres, with his 
boat and his servants. Had begun to take for granted his tin of tea, his 
strongbox filling with coins. What a blind hope that had been. His 
corn was gone, not just the cobs themselves, but the promissory note 
for a future. (286)
After this, the novel depicts the spearing of another settler, Sagitty, followed 
by the climactic sequence, in which the settlers attack the camp of Tom 
Blackwood, another settler who is friendly with the Aborigines (299), and 
murder several of his Aboriginal companions. As Grenville suggests in her 
writing memoir: 
The story of the yam daisies made sense of conflict all over the 
country. It was the story of settlement in miniature. One event came 
after another, no one understood what the other side was thinking, 
and at the end there was bad trouble. It was never a simple matter of 
right and wrong. (Grenville, Searching 132)
This kind of equivalence is somewhat problematic, and mirrors the assertion 
of epistemological equivalence in Clendinnen’s criticism. “Misunderstanding” 
does the work of resettling Lucashenko’s distinction: taking/taking up.
From this perspective, the important distinctions in the novel are actually 
those between settlers, and it is through these relations that Grenville’s 
response becomes explicit. On the one hand, there is the “good settler”—Tom 
Blackwood—whose stated philosophy is “Give a little, take a little, that’s the 
only way” (Grenville, The Secret River 107). Blackwood lives with Aboriginal 
people, but he describes it as his land, and he is the one who suggests that 
Thornhill settle on the point. On the other, there is the rapacious character 
of Smasher, who lives on Broken Bay, and who is responsible for the rape 
and murder of numerous Aboriginal people throughout the book. Thornhill 
occupies a middle position, and is anxious to avoid becoming like Smasher, 
but ultimately becomes involved in the climactic massacre. 
Following the massacre, the novel explicitly portrays the outcome for 
Thornhill as a simultaneous gain and loss. The pacification of the area leads 
to Thornhill’s confirmation of his possession of the land, and to increasing 
wealth into his old age. It is also a loss, firstly of one of his sons, already 
partly acculturated to the local Aboriginal group, who goes to live with the 
‘good’ settler, Tom Blackwood. Beyond this, there is a loss of confidence in 
possession, a kind of dissonance produced within Thornhill’s later years. All 
of this suggests that Grenville has succeeded in unsettling the settler reader, 
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in producing an account that does rearticulate the frontier in the present. 
But it could also be read as a moral negotiation between good and bad forms 
of colonisation, in which the bad prevails through misunderstanding, and 
the logic of escalation. As Lyn McCredden has suggested: 
The emptiness which Thornhill sees each evening in the land, and 
the fullness he has pursued in possessing and cultivating his own little 
piece of earth, are represented as being both of his own making and 
the products of historical forces. (McCredden 23) 
It is significant that these historical forces emerge as a given (rather than 
as a ‘taking’). The moral economy that is constructed in the book leads to 
empathy with both Blackwood and Thornhill, and to the repudiation of 
Smasher, but whether they conduct their activities in brutal or civil ways, 
they perpetuate the settler-colonial articulation directly to the land at the 
expense of indigenous possession. Thus what Tim Rowse has referred to as 
the “counterfactual” of “Australia uncolonised, Aborigines never dispossessed” 
(Rowse 256) is never allowed to appear, and its critical implications remain 
untested here.
As Eleanor Collins argues, an emphasis on loss can be seen to undermine 
progressive assumptions, and that this might be a disunifying, rather than a 
unifying engagement with national myth (47). I would suggest that, rather 
than being disunifying, the novel’s critical success indicates that its function 
is to interpellate the “good” settler and confirm and solidify that position in 
the consciousness of the reader. Part of being the good settler in this liberal 
imaginary is the rehearsal of an unflinching examination, and re-evaluation 
of aspects of the national past. It involves the rehearsal of such an account of 
the frontier, and it is necessarily framed in this case by a logic of escalation 
such as that exemplified in Grenville, an impersonal, historical force that 
is “never a simple matter of right and wrong” (Grenville, Searching 132 ). 
Here, Thornhill’s failure (contrasted with Blackwood’s apparent success), his 
complicity with Smasher, can be corrected by a white reader who has come to 
understand, and is able to recognise this loss as such. The settler has reached 
the point of self-reflection, of self-examination from a transcendent position 
in relation to the frontier, signalling, in effect, its closure or overcoming. The 
“good” settler can see enough to know that both sides had it wrong, that they 
misunderstood, but that now a space for the other can be created within the 
settler cultural text, in parallel with what Grenville understands as “a hollow 
in the book” (198).
But providing a space of recognition is not necessarily progressive. Nor should 
“progress” necessarily be a value in itself in relation to the frontier, which is 
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itself a figure of progress. It could be reread via Patrick Wolfe’s conception 
of the continuity of a settler articulation to land (93), or using Elizabeth 
Povinelli’s concept of “the cunning of recognition” (17), as a strategy that 
facilitates continuity, that shores up and unifies at another level, in this case 
by introducing much the same kind of position that Clendinnen’s “neutral” 
epistemology does—a judicial position, apparently above the action of the 
frontier that it evaluates and describes.
Alongside this moral economy, exemplified in the three settler positions, 
another important feature of the novel is its clear articulation of Thornhill’s 
amorous relationship to the land. This is a revealing feature of the book, 
especially when compared to Grenville’s own strategies of belonging. This 
is the passage where he first encounters the piece of land that he will be 
taking/taking up:
A chaos opened up inside him, a confusion of wanting. No one had 
ever spoken to him of how a man might fall in love with a piece of 
ground. No one had ever spoken of how there could be this teasing 
sparkle and dance of light among the trees, this calm clean space that 
invited feet to enter it.
He let himself imagine it: standing on the crest of that slope, looking 
down over his own place. Thornhill’s Point. It was a piercing hunger 
in his guts: to own it. To say mine, in a way he had never been able to 
say mine of anything at all. He had not known until this minute that it 
was something he wanted so much. (Grenville, The Secret River 106)
When we couple this “confusion of wanting” that guides all of Thornhill’s 
subsequent actions with the restorative gestures of recognition that Grenville 
herself tries to articulate, there is an interesting restorative transformation 
imagined between the two points. This is the transformation of the 
possessive drive of the settler, a drive that leads to loss as well as to great 
wealth, into the settler as the one who has learnt to recognise that loss, 
and who has repositioned themselves as a neutral conduit, as a novelist (or 
reader) who can simultaneously write (or read) settler consciousness and 
make space for Aboriginal consciousness. I would argue that such an image 
of transformation can be contested by suggesting that, through occupying 
such an empathetic position, Grenville is producing, at best, an account of 
regrettable excess, a humanitarian critique of colonialism. The distinction 
taking/taking up is negotiated by the creation of the cognisant settler. This 
can be contrasted with another way of reading the situation, from the 
perspective of the frontier, a position which suggests that the transformation 
of the “good settler” is underwritten by a sublimated version of the same 
possessive logic.
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Since first drafting this essay, the sense of urgency attendant on questions 
of white possession has increased. While it may appear that the cultural 
politics implied in literary and historical texts are remote from immediate 
political questions, announcements made in June 2007 suggest otherwise. 
The collision of humanitarian concern with a logic that articulates directly to 
the land emerged as a significant issue. Thus, the intervention of the federal 
government in the Northern Territory is hinged not only to an authoritarian 
approach in addressing a humanitarian crisis, but also to the suspension of 
land rights.4 Here that which is ‘underwritten’ in a text like Grenville’s—that 
is, the links between possessive logic and humanitarianism—becomes 
explicitly rearticulated in policy in confronting and problematic ways. In 
the declared “state of emergency” the alignment of the “good settler” and 
the violent frontiersman becomes more obvious, and the link between 
dispossession and settler activity, even that which is ostensibly humanitarian, 
is confirmed.
NOTES
 1 The novel was initially submitted as the thesis component of a Doctor of 
Creative Arts degree. Thus, the memoir began as the exegesis component of 
that degree. While this raises some interesting questions about the alignment 
of literary fi ction with academic contexts, the cultural politics of these texts 
remain the focus of this article, irrespective of the particular institutional and 
material conditions of their production.
 2 “My job was to get out of its way”: this way of understanding the practice of 
creative writing has recently been described by novelist Sue Woolfe, drawing on 
neuroscientifi c theories of creativity, as “loose construing” (see Woolfe, 2007). 
While outside the scope of this article, it could be argued that such a practice, 
when applied to Grenville’s problematic, may draw “ready to hand” rather than 
“creative” responses from the author’s cultural context.
 3 A detailed comparison of the two may yield interesting tensions and parallels, 
but is beyond the scope of the present essay.
 4 For a collection of critical responses to this intervention, see Altman and 
Hinkson, 2007. It remains to be seen at the time of publication what changes 
will be made with respect to this initiative by the federal Labor government of 
Kevin Rudd.
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